Doomsdays preachers suggested that Brexit and Trump would mean the end of the liberal world order as we know it and thus the end of the EU. The research presented here suggests the opposite. Not only have Europeans turned their back to populism by voting yes to reforms and pro-EU-parties and governments in different member states over the past months, but Brexit and Trump also seems to have given a complete new momentum to the European project. This article demonstrates why Brexit cannot be generalized to the rest of the continent but is the result of a complicated and special British conception of what it means to be a sovereign state in the 21 st century. Moreover and paradoxically, surveys show that the greatest fear among Europeans today is not more European integration but right wing populism and European Disunion.
Introduction
try to ask what we can learn from Brexit and whether the UK's goodbye to the EU is likely to be emulated in other European countries in the near future. Is the EU falling apart or was the UK relationship with Europe so special that the domino thesis predicted by many after the Brexit-vote and the election of Donald Trump in the US must be rejected? This chapter argues and seeks to demonstrate that Brexit most likely will be a unique endeavour. As it is dangerous to predict about the future this will also not be attempted here. However, it will be suggested that the UK's historical past, uneasy relationship with Europe and in particular its obsession with sovereignty is and always has been special compared to most other member states and that it may have influenced the decision to leave the EU and to hold a referendum in the first place. It is important here to emphasize that this chapter/article does not represent a thorough analysis of the UK's decision to leave or to hold a referendum. It is also not an in depth comparison between the UK and other European countries.
Rather it looks at some specific but -I will argue -important traits and central issues related to the 'domino' thesis presented by scholars and commentators after Brexit and the election of Trump. Apart from a look at the special British situation the chapter will thus focus on the result of the national elections in Europe following Brexit and Trump where populism and anti-European sentiments were expected to take hold. It will also use important opinion polls from European countries in the aftermath of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as an indicator of the domino-effect predicting an undermining of liberal institutions like the EU.
The chapter/article is structured in four parts. The first part discusses whether populism is an unstoppable global and European trend and argues that no -it is a very crude narrative proposed by the media and certain commentators. Little in the data we have collected here suggests that populism is a coherent unstoppable wave that is taking all liberal institutions down. The second part argues that the British uneasy relationship with the EU has always been different and that their type of antiEuropeanism is of a sort that we do not find in most other European countries. What is scrutinized most in depth here is the British conception of sovereignty which was at the core not only of the 'leave campaign' but also in Theresa May's emphasis on 'taking back control of our own laws' and escaping the European Court of Justice. The third part looks closely at the opinion polls in other European countries. Here it is documented that dissatisfaction with the establishment, with political elites and globalization and the EU plays out differently in different European countries. The fourth part, finally, concludes and summarizes the findings.
Populism: an irreversible trend?
The big question in many EU capitals but certainly also in Brussels after the British decision to leave the EU in the referendum of June 23, 2016 was exactly whether other countries would follow suit. referenda in the coming years will probably in part depend on the final outcome of the Brexit negotiations and the deal that the UK eventually gets. If the outcome were to be too beneficial for the 5 Cited from Z HYPERLINK "http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/martin-schulz-sieht-bedrohungdurch-europafeindliche-bewegungen-14173019.html" 6 See e.g. The National Interest, "Europe Will Implode", http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-eu-will-likely-implode-15314; Just like during the financial crisis where many American analysts and media people saw the end of not only the Eurozone but the EU as such, Brexit and Trump will now result in a meltdown of all liberal institutions -at least so it is predicted However, as with the Eurozone where as Foreign Affairs puts it: "…a Spanish bailout came and went; a new Italian government restored confidence, as did European Central Bank President Mario Draghi" 6 who pledged that he wanted to do 'whatever it takes' to save the euro. Things did in other words not end as predicted in the newsrooms. 7 See www.politico.eu/article/why-marine-le-pen-wont-win-trump-brexit/ 8 www.politico.eu/article/why-marine-le-pen-wont-win-trump-brexit/ UK -getting access to the single market but with fewer strings attached than what is the case under the current EU rules, this could animate anti EU-movements in other European countries to campaign for a similar exit route for their countries. Influential EU-sceptic parties in Denmark have thus explicitly announced that they will demand a referendum if the deal that the UK gets is more favourable to the UK than expected and thus to the one Norway already has. Nevertheless, at this stage the likelihood that the UK will be able to obtain a good deal seems rather limited, which suggests that it is unlikely that other EU member states will seek to follow the same path.
Why the UK is special
It is hardly controversial to say that the UK is exceptional when it comes to its rather schizophrenic approach to the EU 9 . Moreover, defining British opposition to the EU as part of a British exceptionalism makes it possible to examine this specialness more thoroughly. For the British people, the EU has represented different possibilities. For some the EU was a promise of peace and stability, for others the Single Market's promise of jobs and prosperity was at the centre of attention. However, as pointed out by Leonard , none of these readings or possibilities seems seductive enough anymore.
10
The British people today understand the EU both as a heavy bureaucratic machinery and as the cause behind many of the negative changes in their society, like migration, rising housing costs, and inequality. A vote for Brexit moreover was for some also a way to reinvigorate the past British 'Grandeur' -with the UK becoming an economic powerhouse by itself. Thus, the opposition is deeper than just structural or institutional factors, which is highlighted by the more pragmatic and utilitarian approaches to the EU.
11
The UK first applied to join the Common Market in 1963 but membership was vetoed by the French needed to be part of the project. The same attitude reoccurred over the years and can for sure also be found in the 2016 referendum, here premised on the belief, that the UK could quit the project, because it now has higher cost than benefits, with no deleterious consequences.
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In sum, whether the 1975 referendum was historic or not, fighting Brussels already began shortly after the 1975 referendum and in 1984, at a summit in Fontainbleau, the UK obtained its famous 'rebate' from the EEC, after Margaret Thatcher threatened not to pay into the EU budget. 14 As
Thatcher put it: 'We are not asking the Community or anyone else for money. We are simply asking to have our own money back.'
15
The UK was at the time the third poorest member of the Community but ended up becoming the biggest net contributor to the EU budget. This was mainly because the UK had relatively little agriculture and thus a rather small share of farm subsidies, which at the time made up more than 70% of the EU budget.
In 1993, John Major had problems selling the Maastricht Treaty to his own back-benchers. The Treaty was voted down at a referendum in Denmark in 1992 resulting in the so-called Edinburgh-agreement
where Denmark was given permanent opt-outs on 1) the euro; 2) defence; 3) Union citizenship -an opt-out that was later deleted as it was no longer relevant 16 claiming that it wanted the UK to be in 'the heart of Europe'. The repeated promise of an EU referendum throughout the British history rests on two concerns. First, that the EU membership was too restrictive for the UK, here perceived as a more free-trade and 18 Tony Barber reporting for the Financial Times: "The UK prime minister's appearance at an EU summit of heads of state and government tomorrow will be his first visit to Brussels since he succeeded Tony Blair in June -a lengthy absence that has not gone unnoticed at the European Commission and among EU national embassies. Britain at the moment is more detached from the EU than at any time since the mid-1980s," says an experienced western European ambassador, referring to the years when Margaret Thatcher, as UK premier, adopted a famously abrasive stance on Europe". Citizens aging 50 years and up were in large majority in favour of leaving the EU. The younger generations largely voted 'remain'. Education also played a role as 63% of the people with a "low attention to politics" voted 'leave' and 62% of the people in the lowest income group voted 'leave'.
Taking back control or "The Allure of Sovereignity"
"The UK has long been shorn of its empire; now it will be shorn of Europe, too"
In her Lancaster House speech 24 but also during the leave campaign (of which Theresa May did not take part as she herself recommended to vote 'remain') two central elements were recurring. The first was to 'to take back control' of migration. Not asylum seekers and refugees -who had hardly surfaced as a problem during the debate but rather EU migrants. The second was the wish to escape the CJEU jurisdiction and to 'write and judge on our own laws', as May put it in her speech. 37 and the ECJ case law is very rarely cited by these countries highest courts. 38 The UK is thus not alone in its ambivalent relationship to the ECJ (or the European Court of Human Rights for that matter). Countries based on majoritarian democracy will always find it hard to merge into a political system like the European one based on constitutional rather than majoritarian principles.
The question, however, is whether 'unconstrained' majoritarian democracy is a very useful guide in a globalized world where sovereignty increasingly is something you pool rather than retain? In other words, do you become more rather than less sovereign by leaving the EU? You may think more. Yet, being outside the EU with no influence on the rules that will limit and structure any states manoeuvring in a 21st century global society will most likely make you much less sovereign. This is in fact confirmed by the UK government project of a "Great Repeal bill". 39 As the government white paper make clear, the bill will simply copy-paste EU law into UK law. Moreover, if the UK wants to continue trading with the EU in the future it will largely have to live up to and implement the exact same standards in effect today among the EU member states. Regardless of the details of the withdrawal deal, the UK remain heavily dependent on the rules and regulations of one of the world's 40 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-great-repeal-bill-white-paper The Government's white paper on the Repeal Bill has no exact figures for the number of EU rules which will be transferred into domestic law. However, it does note that there are currently more than 12,000 EU regulations in force. The White Paper adds that Parliament has passed 7,900 statutory instruments implementing EU legislation and 186 Acts which incorporate a degree of EU influence.
largest market -just like the Norwegians and the Swiss are. The British people may 'believe' that they are more sovereign than regular EU members by focusing merely on the formal rules but in reality they end up being much less sovereign than if they had remained a member exercising influence on its own future laws and regulations. 40 As McBide argues 41 -the UK when discussing to leave the EU had to decide about continuing to be a 'rule maker' or -if quitting -become merely a 'rule taker'. The essential question was whether the UK wanted to continue being either inside influencing the law-making or turn into a 'rule taker', following those rules that the EU has made and which will shape the future 42 . As pointed out in an analysis on sovereignty and the Brexit debate in
The Economist:
"Many talk of being sovereign as if it were like being pregnant: one either is or is not.
The truth is more complex. A country can be wholly sovereign yet have little influence.
Britain has signed some 700 international treaties that impinge on sovereignty. Although the EU has the biggest impact, others count a lot: membership of NATO, for example,
creates an obligation to go to war if another member country is attacked. It can be worth ceding this independence to gain influence". 
However, as things looks now overall pro-European sentiments have increased in Denmark after
Brexit. Certainly things may not stay that way and much will probably depend on the quality of the deal that the UK ends up getting with the EU, but polls show that so far the Danes stick to what they know and what they got. Let's now take a closer look at the surveys and results we have managed to collect so far. The general picture is also here that the UK is much more sceptical towards the EU construct than any of the other European Member States.
Will other countries follow the UK out? No so likely….
'Should I stay or should I go now?' asked the Clash back in 1982. 'Stay' is certainly the answer if we look at public opinion polls and surveys from the months following the Brexit referendum. Two important insights can be taken home from the preliminary data, polls and surveys we have collected.
Firstly, populism and attitudes towards Europe and European integration have different roots and causes in different EU member states: According to the data, therefore, it is not possible to detect a general aligned anti-establishment or populist trend. Secondly, data reveal that also after the activation of art.50 there continues to be a great split in attitude towards Europe between the UK and the continent.
After Brexit there were however as indicated earlier a lot of discussion on who would follow next.
Even people in the new Trump administration saw Brexit and the UK's goodbye to the EU as the first sign of a genuine European split: "According to different media rapports the first question asked by the new Trump administration to European officials in Brussels was: "who will leave next" 44 .
It is in this light rather interesting to take a look at the first European surveys after the Brexit-vote.
They may thus be able to tell us a little about where the attitudes in Europe are moving. The first survey we have consulted is the YouGov European Mega Survey from August-September 2016.
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This Survey, conducted right after the Brexit vote, confirmed that Britain is a special case when it comes to the public's approval of EU membership. The majority of the respondents in the other Member States have a much higher approval rating of their EU membership than UK respondents.
In another segment, being asked about EU immigration, the distribution shows however that France also has a large number of people seeing immigration from other EU countries as a bad thing. The other countries score lower. Moreover, being asked if it is likely that their country will leave the EU, of all countries other than Britain only 1/5 say that they believe their country will be next. The
YouGov dataset goes into detail with a lot of EU countries on some central issues. Relevant for our research here however is the overview of whether the populations would vote 'remain' or 'leave' if an 'exit' referendum where to be held. The data above shows that in August 2016 -after the 'real' referendum -45% of the Britons would vote to leave the EU, which is slightly higher than the percentage (43%) who would remain. In contrast the populations of the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany would all vote to stay in the EU, with confident margin. A study with similar results comes from the Bertelsmann Stiftung. 46 The data here shows that since Britain voted to leave the EU, there have been signs of a more positive approach in other countries to the EU. This is something that might be explained by the many uncertainties surrounding the UK situation after the referendum. It thus suggests as we also will get back to below when analysing the national elections held in other European countries in 2017 that Brexit may in fact have had the opposite effect than expected by the domino theory and taken some of the air out of the populist movements in Europe.
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To put it differently not much of the data we have had the opportunity to look at supports the doomsdayers' prediction that other EU member states will put Europe on the ballot not to mention leave the EU in the near future. If we look at data from the Pew Institute we learn that "Populism is not a coherent transatlantic trend." 47 It is moreover underlined that the populism that can be detected What concerns many Europeans at the moment is however exactly, but perhaps also paradoxically, the rise in (right wing) protest parties. In a future of Europe survey (Eurobarometer) an in-depth study asked the public about the central concerns EU face right now, and how they see the Union in the future.
The survey concluded 61 : "[t]hat the majority of respondents see the rise of political parties protesting against the traditional political elites in various European countries is a matter of concern (59%), with 21% totally agreeing with this statement. Overall, three in ten disagree with this statement (30%), with 9% saying they totally disagree. 11% do not know" (Eurobarometer, 2016: 83).
The chart shows that there is generally a high concern about the rise of anti-establishment parties as AfD, Front Nationale and Geert Wilders' Freedom Party. Germany scores the highest on the chart when it comes to agreeing that the rise of anti-establishment parties is a matter of concern.
The survey was undertaken soon after the UK voted to leave the EU. Here it was also found that "The majority of respondents have a positive view of the European Union, and agree it embodies peace, social equality and solidarity, and tolerance and openness to others. Moreover, […]Most respondents support more European-level decision making in a range of key policy areas, including fighting terrorism, promoting democracy and peace, protecting the environment and dealing with migration issues. Since 2014, there have been large increases in the proportions who think there should be more EU level decision-making about health and social security issues and migration issues from outside the EU. Although most agree more decision making should take place at the EU level, respondents' opinions are divided over a "two-speed Europe".
Finally, a large majority of respondents consider that the European Union project offers a future perspective for Europe's youth."
Just to supplement the study about the anxiety concerning the rise of anti-establishment parties we have done a study of the number of right wing parties in selected EU countries. In particular Hungary and Poland give rise to concern:
Conclusions
This chapter has examined and discussed whether Brexit will be emulated in other member states in the near future. The answer to this question has been a solid no: this is not very likely. In fact, to the contrary several things today suggest that because of Brexit and Trump Europeans are moving closer together. Not father apart. As it is obviously, impossible and risky to predict about the future the analysis here has been based on a critical examination of the projections made about populism as a general western phenomenon fostered by anti-establishment sentiments following from the Brexit referendum in June 2016 and the election of Trump in November 2016. It was then discussed how the special British relationship with Europe might tell us a something about how the UK is different in terms of wanting to risk its access to the world's greatest market in a yes/no referendum. Finally, the chapter investigated the past 3 national/presidential elections in Europe to try to find evidence of a populist surge among Europeans and in fact found the opposite. This tendency was further confirmed by investigating recent opinion polls and surveys documenting that the rise in right wing populism in Europe has indeed been decreasing together with a stabilization in the support for right wing parties. It was also shown that the largest fear among Europeans today is in fact not globalisation or more power to Brussels but almost the contrary: a rise and increasing empowerment of right wing populism.
The main finding when it comes to the British goodbye to the EU was its conception of sovereignty as a zero zum game. The obsession with 'taking back control' and retrieving some kind of formal sovereignty is to a large extend shared with in particular the Scandinavian countries who also have a majoritarian outlook and view European integration in a very formalist fashion. More Europe is in this light always conflated with less national sovereignty instead of for instance seeing a stronger EU as a precondition for the ability of individual nations to continue influencing the world. Solving problems jointly with other nations should thus not -as the present author sees it -be equated with a loos of impact on one's own future but as a unique opportunity to actually form one's own destiny by influencing (rather than being influenced by) the European rules of the game. Whether other countries -i.e. the Scandinavians -in the future will follow in the UK's footsteps is therefore hard to predict. However, a lot will probably depend on the deal that the UK manages to negotiate with Brussels. Denmark in particular has previously on many occasions used the UK as a negotiating shield and as a copycat for deals that Denmark wanted to obtain for itself. It is therefore also quite clear that should the brits get a deal that -when seen from an equally sovereignty obsessed nation's perspective -is too tempting another referenda on Europe cannot be entirely excluded.
